Criminal Law and Procedure Decisions: INS v. St. Cyr</titl <body>  <script language="javascript1.1" src="http://images.findlaw.com/tracking/wss-lp.js"></script> <script language="javascript1.1" src="http://images.findlaw.com/tracking/hbx-0250.js"></script> <noscript> <img src="http://ehg-findlaw.hitbox.com/HG?hc=we76&cd=1&hv=6&ce=u&hb=DM531216MLSZ&n=LP&vcon=NO+JAVASCRIPT&vpc=HBX0250u" border="0" width="1" height="1"> </noscript>  <div id="main"> <div id="doc3" class="pro"> <div id="bd"> <div class="yui-g" id="header"> <div id="header_sub_center"> <h1 id="logo"><a href="http://lp.findlaw.com"><b>FindLaw | Find a Lawyer. Find Answers.</b></a></h1> <div id="question"> <h3><a href="http://www.findlaw.com/" class="c_4">Non-Professional? 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St. Cyr</h5><P align="center"><b>Habeas Corpus – Alien Deportation Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241</b></p><p><b>Case: <a href="http://laws.findlaw.com/us/000/00-767.html">INS v. St. Cyr</a></b></p><p><b>Issues</b>: (1) Whether habeas corpus jurisdiction is available, [after passage of the Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) and the Illegal Immigration Reform & Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), which amended the Immigration & Nationality Act (“INA”)] under the general habeas corpus statute, <a href="http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/ts_search.pl?title=28&sec=2241">28 U.S.C. § 2241</a>, in order to judicially determine the Attorney General’s discretionary authority to grant relief from deportation. (2) Whether the restrictions on the Attorney General’s discretionary authority to grant relief from deportation, contained in IIRIRA, apply to removal proceedings brought against an alien <U>after</U> passage of IIRIRA, but based on a guilty plea entered <U>before</U> enactment.</p><b><p>Facts</b>: Respondent Enrico St. Cyr, a citizen of Haiti and a lawful permanent resident of the United States for ten years, pled guilty in March 1996 to selling a controlled substance. That conviction made him deportable. Under pre-IIRIRA law, which was applicable at the time of the guilty plea and conviction, St. Cyr would have been eligible for waiver of deportation at the Attorney General’s discretion. Removal proceedings for his deportation, however, did not commence until April 1997, after IIRIRA went into effect. Under IIRIRA, the Attorney General no longer possessed discretionary authority to grant relief from deportation for aliens previously convicted of an aggravated felony. The Attorney General claimed that under IIRIRA he no longer possesses retroactive discretionary authority to waive deportation for aliens who entered guilty pleas prior to IIRIRA’s effective date.</p><p>In his habeas corpus petition, St. Cyr argued that the restrictions on the Attorney General’s discretionary authority, contained in IIRIRA, do not apply to removal proceedings brought against an alien who pled guilty to a deportable crime before the enactment of that statute. The District Court accepted jurisdiction and agreed with St. Cyr’s submission. In accord with decisions handed down in four other Circuits, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The Court granted certiorari because of the importance of both the procedural question of jurisdiction and the substantive question of the impact of IIRIRA amendments on conduct occurring prior to enactment.</p><b><p>Holding</b>: (1) Courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to decide the legal issue contained in St. Cyr’s habeas corpus petition. (2) Discretionary relief from the Attorney General, afforded under former § 212 of the INA (<a href="http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/ts_search.pl?title=8&sec=1182">8 U.S.C. § 1182</a>), remains available for aliens whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements entered into prior to the enactment of IIRIRA and who would have been eligible for such discretionary relief at the time of their plea.</p><b><p>Reasoning</b>: </p><U><p>Issue I</p></U><p>The INS argued that § 401(e) of AEDPA and three sections of IIRIRA (<a href="http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/ts_search.pl?title=8&sec=1252">8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(1)</a>, <a href="http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/ts_search.pl?title=8&sec=1252">1252(a)(2)(c)</a>, and <a href="http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/ts_search.pl?title=8&sec=1252">1252(b)(9)</a> “stripped the courts of jurisdiction to decide the question of law presented by respondent’s habeas corpus application.” The Court disagreed, noting the longstanding strong presumption in favor of habeas judicial review and the requirement for clear congressional intent to remove habeas jurisdiction. “Implications from statutory text or legislative history are not sufficient to repeal habeas jurisdiction; instead, Congress must articulate specific and unambiguous statutory directives to effect a repeal.... In this case, the plain statement rule draws additional reinforcement from other canons of statutory construction.” First, when construction of a statute would invoke the outer limits of Congress’s authority, a clear indication that Congress intended such a result is required. Second, if an acceptable construction of a statute would raise “serious constitutional problems,” but an alternative construction is “fairly possible,” the courts are “obligated to construe the statute to avoid such problems.”</p><p>Applying these canons here, the Court observed that “[a] construction of the amendments at issue that would entirely preclude review of a pure question of law by any court would give rise to substantial constitutional questions.” Citing the Suspension Clause of the Constitution (Art. I, § 9, cl. 2), [“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it”] the Court concluded that “[b]ecause of that Clause, some ‘judicial intervention in deportation cases’ is unquestionably ‘required by the Constitution.’” The INS argued, however, that an historical examination of the Suspension Clause made clear that the Clause did not protect habeas jurisdiction in the circumstances at hand. Again, the Court disagreed. “In sum, even assuming that the Suspension Clause protects only the writ as it existed in 1789, there is substantial evidence to support the proposition that pure questions of law like the one raised by the respondent in this case could have been answered in 1789 by a common law judge with power to issue the writ of habeas corpus. It necessarily follows that a serious Suspension Clause issue would be presented if we were to accept the INS’s submission that the 1996 statutes have withdrawn that power from federal judges and have provided no adequate substitute for its existence. The necessity of resolving such a serious and difficult constitutional issue - and the desirability of avoiding that necessity - simply reinforces the reasons for requiring a clear and unambiguous statement of constitutional intent.” The statutes, and the four provisions purportedly removing habeas jurisdiction, the Court concluded, do not contain such a clear statement.</p><p>Addressing the four specific provisions raised by INS, the Court first examined AEDPA and the title of § 401(e), ELIMINATION OF CUSTODY REVIEW BY HABEAS CORPUS, which seemed to support the INS’s argument of clear congressional intent to remove habeas jurisdiction. Examining the text of § 401(e), however, the Court found that a clear statement of congressional intent was lacking. With respect to the provision’s title, the Court stated that a provision’s title alone is not controlling. For the three provisions contained in IIRIRA, the Court observed that those provisions address “judicial review” only. In the immigration context, however, “judicial review” and “habeas corpus” have “historically distinct meanings.” Therefore, these provisions do not address or remove habeas jurisdiction. Reasserting the Court’s concern with the purported complete removal of any form of habeas judicial review of this subject matter, the Court finally concluded: “If it were clear that the question of law [involving the Attorney General’s discretionary authority] could be answered in another judicial forum, it might be permissible to accept the INS’ reading of § 1252. But the absence of such a forum, coupled with the lack of a clear, unambiguous, and express statement of congressional intent to preclude judicial consideration on habeas of such an important question of law, strongly counsels against adopting a construction that would raise serious constitutional questions.” Therefore, the Court concluded that habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 was <U>not</U> repealed by AEDPA and IIRIRA.</p><U><p>Issue II</p></U><p>“The absence of a clearly expressed statement of congressional intent” also pervaded the Court’s review of the specific merits of St. Cyr’s claim that new restrictions on the Attorney General’s discretionary authority did not apply to guilty pleas made prior to the IIRIA amendments. The Court observed that when St. Cyr entered his guilty plea, two consequences occurred: (1) he became deportable; and (2) he became eligible for discretionary relief from deportation. The issue before the Court was whether IIRIRA’s § 304(b) “changed the second consequence by eliminating respondent’s eligibility for a waiver.” </p><p>Despite the dangers of retroactive legislation, Congress has the authority, within constitutional limits, to enact it. Under the <U>Landgraf</U> test, [<a href="http://laws.findlaw.com/us/000/u10414.html">Landgraf v. USI Film Products</a>, 511 U.S. 244 (1994)] however, a statute may not be applied retroactively unless (1) there is clear congressional intent for such an application; and (2) such an application would not create an impermissible result by creating “new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment.” The Court held that IIRIRA’s purported retroactive elimination of § 212(c)’s discretionary review failed both elements of the <U>Landgraf</U> test.</p><p>First, the Court rejected the argument that a comprehensive statute such as IIRIRA, by merely going into effect, demonstrates congressional intent that it may be applied to events that occurred prior to its effective date. “By itself, the comprehensiveness of a congressional enactment says nothing about Congress’ intentions with respect to the retroactivity of the enactment’s individual provisions.” Nor did the “effective date” of the statute provide a clear statement of congressional intent to apply it retroactively. “A statement that a statute will become effective on a certain date does not even arguably suggest that it has any application to conduct that occurred at an earlier date.” The Court also held that the statute’s “saving provision” which declined to apply the new deportation rules to removal proceedings which began prior to the statute’s effective date was irrelevant since this provision merely dealt with <U>procedural rules</U> to be applied pending the effective date. The Court noted that nothing in the text of the “saving provision” or in IIRIRAs’ legislative history discussed the statute’s effect on deportation proceedings based on pre-enactment convictions. The Court was more impressed by Congress’ willingness in other parts of IIRIRA, to unambiguously apply specific sections retroactively. This was an indication that Congress “did not definitely decide” § 304(b)’s application to pre-enactment convictions. There was simply no clear congressional intent with respect to retroactive application of the statute.</p><p>Second, the Court also held that removing the Attorney General’s discretionary authority to grant relief to those persons who had entered into plea agreements prior to enactment of IIRIRA “clearly ‘attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past.’” Plea agreements involve a <I>quid pro quo</I> between the Government and a criminal defendant. Relying upon settled practice, advice of counsel, and perhaps assurances in open court that an entry of a guilty plea would not foreclose § 212(c) relief, numerous defendants such as St. Cyr agreed to plead guilty. “Now that prosecutors have received the benefit of these plea agreements, agreements that were likely facilitated by the aliens’ belief in their continued eligibility for § 212(c) relief, it would surely be contrary to ‘familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations’ to hold that IIRIRA’s subsequent restrictions deprive them of any possibility of such relief.”</p><b><p>Other Opinions</b>: In dissent Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas and in part by Justice O’Connor, accused the majority of finding “ambiguity in the utterly clear language of a statute that forbids the district court (and all other courts) to entertain the claims of aliens such as respondent St. Cyr.” As a result, the majority has created “a version of the statute that affords <I>criminal</I> aliens <I>more</I> opportunities for delay - inducing judicial review than are afforded to non-criminal aliens, or even than were afforded to criminal aliens prior to this legislation concededly designed to <I>expedite</I> their removal.”</p><p>In Part II of his dissent, Justice Scalia further asserted that a straightforward reading of the Suspension Clause “discloses that it does not guarantee any content to (or even the existence of) the writ of habeas corpus, but merely provides that the writ shall not (except in the case of rebellion or invasion) be suspended.... To ‘suspend’ the writ was not to fail to enact it, much less to refuse to accord it particular content.” Rather, to suspend was to cause the Privilege of the Writ to “cease for a time,” in the words of Noah Webster. Court precedent made clear that “without legislated habeas jurisdiction the Suspension Clause would have no effect.” But even if the Suspension Clause did guarantee some minimum of habeas relief, Scalia concluded that such a minimum “would assuredly not embrace the rarified right asserted here: the right of judicial compulsion of the exercise of Executive <I>discretion</I> (which may be exercised favorably or unfavorably) regarding a prisoner’s release.” </p><p>[In Part III of his dissent Scalia briefly rejected St. Cyr’s due process and Article III arguments, which were so insubstantial that “the Court [did] not even bother to mention them.”]</p><p>Justice O’Connor joined Justice Scalia’s dissent except for Part II. She believed “that, assuming, <I>arguendo,</I> that the Suspension Clause guarantees some minimum extent of habeas review, the right asserted by [St. Cyr] falls outside the scope of that review.” There was no need, therefore, “to say more.” </p><b><p>Comment: </b>The majority’s obvious disregard of the plain text of statutes stripping the federal courts of a portion of their habeas jurisdiction is troubling. Congress is now free to amend these statutes again making its intent even more crystal clear on the jurisdictional issue. This would force the Court to confront the allegedly "difficult constitutional question" involved in habeas jurisdiction-stripping and could set up an interesting constitutional confrontation.</p></div> </div>       <div id="fl_container3"> <script language="javascript">fl_legal_645x52();</script> <script language="javascript">fl_legal_645x52();</script> <script language="javascript">fl_legal_645x52();</script> <div id="fl_label">Ads by FindLaw</div> </div> <script> hide_box('fl_container3'); </script>   <div id="fl_container_goog"> <script language="JavaScript1.1" src="http://images.findlaw.com/lp/google.js"></script> <script language="JavaScript" src="http://pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/show_ads.js"></script> </div>  </div> </div> <div class="nav_right rn_inner">  <div class="sections yui-g"> <h2 class="right" style="color:#666666;">Welcome Legal Professionals</h2> <p>FindLaw provides the resources to help you practice law. 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