Criminal Law Summaries
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Due Process Failure to Prove Element of the Offense
Case: Fiore v. White
Issue: Can Pennsylvania, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendments Due Process Clause, convict a defendant for conduct that its criminal statute, as properly interpreted, does not prohibit?
Facts: William Fiore and David Scarpone were convicted, in a joint trial, of operating a hazardous waste storage, treatment and disposal facility without a permit, in violation of a Pennsylvania criminal statute. See Pa. Stat. Ann. Tit. 35, § 6018.401(a). Fiore and Scarpone were, respectively, the owner and general manager of a Pennsylvania hazardous waste disposal facility. Pennsylvania conceded that Fiore and Scarpone possessed a permit, but argued at trial that they had deviated so dramatically from the permits terms [by deliberately altering a monitoring pipe in order to hide a leakage problem] that [they] nonetheless had violated the statute.
The jury convicted both men and the trial court upheld the conviction in a written opinion, accepting the Commonwealths theory of prosecution. Fiore appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court which summarily affirmed his conviction on the basis of the opinion of the court below. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Fiore leave to appeal on March 13, 1990, and shortly thereafter his conviction became final.
Meanwhile, Scarpone appealed to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court which set his conviction aside in 1991, calling Pennsylvanias interpretation of the statute strained at best. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court in 1993 and held that Pennsylvania had not made out the crime of operating a waste disposal facility without a permit. Simply put, Mr. Scarpone did have a permit. . . . [T]o conclude that the alteration constituted the operation of a new facility without a permit is a bald fiction we cannot endorse. See Commonwealth v. Scarpone, 535 Pa. 273 (1993).
After the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to review Scarpones conviction, Fiore asked that court to review his own case once before Scarpones conviction was reversed and twice after Scarpones conviction was reversed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined Fiores requests. Fiore then sought state collateral relief, but was rebuffed by the trial court which refused to apply Scarpone retroactively. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Fiores appeal. Fiore next sought federal habeas relief arguing that Pennsylvania had imprisoned him for conduct which was not criminal under the statutory section charged. The Federal District Court granted his petition, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that Pennsylvania was not required to apply Scarpone retroactively. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in part to decide whether the Due Process Clause requires a State to apply a new interpretation of a state criminal statute retroactively to cases on collateral review. The Supreme Court, however, first certified the following question to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court: Does the interpretation of . . . § 6018.401(a) . . . set forth in [Scarpone] state the correct interpretation of the law of Pennsylvania at the date Fiores conviction became final? Fiore v. White, 528 U.S. 23, 120 S.Ct. 409 (1999). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court replied that: Scarpone did not announce a new rule of law. Our ruling merely clarified the plain language of the statute. . . . Our interpretation of [§ 6018.401(a)] in Scarpone furnishes the proper statement of law at the date Fiores conviction became final.
Holding: This Courts precedents make clear that Fiores conviction and continued incarceration on this charge violate due process.
Reasoning: The Court issued a per curiam opinion. Given the Pennsylvania Supreme Courts answer to the United States Supreme Courts certified question, retroactivity was no longer an issue. The Court held long ago that the Fourteenth Amendments Due Process Clause requires a State to prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt before convicting a defendant of a crime. Here, failing to possess a permit was a basic element of the crime as it existed at the time of Fiores conviction. The parties agree that the Commonwealth presented no evidence whatsoever to prove that basic element. In fact, Pennsylvania conceded that Fiore had a permit. The simple, inevitable conclusion is that Fiores conviction fails to satisfy the Federal Constitutions demands.
Other Opinions: None
Comment: One has to wonder whether the materials from Fiores waste treatment facility found their way into the drinking water of the Pennsylvania judicial system. What originally looked like an interesting and uncertain issue of constitutional law, involving retroactive application of a statutory interpretation to a matter on collateral review, became a no-brainer after the Pennsylvania Supreme Courts admission that the statute in question had always meant what it said. Luckily for that court, it was not forced to explain why it let stand an innocent mans conviction for several years.