Criminal Law Summaries
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Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel
Case: Texas v. CobbIssue: Does the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, held to be offense specific in McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991), attach not only to the offense with which a defendant is charged, but to other offenses closely related factually to the charged offense?
Facts: In December 1993, Lindsey Owings reported to the Walker County Sheriffs office that his home had been burglarized and that his wife Margaret and 16-month old daughter Kori Rae were missing. In July 1994, while under arrest for an unrelated offense, Respondent Raymond Cobb confessed to the burglary but denied any knowledge of the disappearances. Cobb subsequently was indicted on the burglary charge and was provided court-appointed counsel, Hal Ridley, in August 1994. Investigators thereafter (in 1994 and 1995) twice asked and received permission from Ridley to question Cobb about the disappearances. On each occasion, Cobb denied any involvement. In November 1995, while living in Odessa and out on bond for the burglary, Cobb admitted to his father that he had murdered Margaret Owings during the course of the burglary. Cobbs father contacted the Walker County Sheriffs office which obtained a warrant for Cobbs arrest. Odessa police took Cobb into custody and administered Miranda warnings. Ridley was not notified. Cobb waived his Miranda rights and shortly thereafter confessed to killing Margaret and Kori Rae. He led police to the location where he had buried their remains.
Cobb was convicted of capital murder for murdering more than one person in the course of a single criminal transaction. He was also sentenced to die. On appeal, he argued that the right to counsel had attached when Ridley was appointed and that the Odessa police investigators should have obtained Ridleys permission before initiating questioning. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that once the right to counsel attaches to the offense charged, it also attaches to any other offense that is very closely related factually to the offense charged. The Court of Criminal Appeals found the capital murder charge to be factually interwoven with the burglary and thus held that Cobbs right to counsel had attached on the capital murder charge when Ridley was appointed in the burglary case, even though [Cobb] had not yet been charged with that offense. The court further found that Cobb had asserted his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by accepting Ridleys appointment in the burglary case.
Holding: (1) The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to crimes that are factually related to those that have actually been charged. (2) Though the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific, it does encompass offenses that, even if not formally charged, would be considered the same offense under the Blockburger test. (3) The Sixth Amendment right to counsel, did not bar police from interrogating [Cobb] regarding the murders, because, under Texas law, burglary and murder each require proof of a fact which the other does not, thus constituting separate offenses under the Blockburger test. Therefore Cobbs confession to the police was admissible.
Reasoning: The majority noted that the Courts decision in McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991), meant what it said, and that the Sixth Amendment right [to counsel] . . . is offense specific. The right to counsel cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions, for it does not attach until a prosecution is commenced, that is, at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings. The Court rejected characterizations of McNeil, and reliance upon Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 1985) (both decided before McNeil), to support the view that the offense-specific definition has an exception for factually related crimes. Simply put, there is no such exception.
Recognizing that the definition of an offense is not necessarily limited to the four corners of a charging instrument, the Court adopted the Blockburger test to determine the scope of an offense. In Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), the Court stated that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether these are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. At the time Cobb confessed to the murders, he had been indicted for burglary. As defined by Texas law, burglary and capital murder are not the same offenses under Blockburger. Accordingly, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not bar police from interrogating Cobb regarding the murders. Criticizing Cobbs argument that the offense-specific scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel would be disastrous to suspects constitutional protections, the Court stated that the defined scope rests upon two essential considerations. First, every suspect prior to custodial interrogation must still, pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966), be apprised of his rights against compulsory self-incrimination and to consult with an attorney. In this case, the police scrupulously followed Mirandas dictates when questioning Cobb. Second, it is critical to recognize that the Constitution does not negate societys interest in the ability of police to talk to witnesses and suspects, even those who have been charged with other offenses. Cobb knowingly waived his Miranda rights and was questioned on a different offense from the burglary charge for which he had been indicted. There were no violations of Cobbs constitutional rights; therefore, his confession was admissible.
Other Opinions: In a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, Justice Kennedy observed that the Court reached its conclusion without the necessity of reaffirming or giving approval to Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), a course of action Kennedy deemed wise, for the underlying theory of Jackson seems questionable. [Jackson carried the prophylactic Fifth Amendment rule of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (once an accused indicates a desire to have counsel present during interrogation the police may not reinitiate questioning unless the accused himself first initiates the questioning and knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to counsel), over into the Sixth Amendment right to counsel context, applying the Edwards test to police questioning of a suspect who indicated at arraignment his desire to accept court appointed counsel.] Expanding this thought further, Kennedy wrote: As the facts in this case well illustrate, it is difficult to understand the utility of a Sixth Amendment rule that operates to invalidate a confession given by the free choice of suspects who have received proper advice of their Miranda rights but waived them nonetheless. Even if Jackson is to remain good law, its protections should apply only where a suspect has made a clear and unambiguous assertion of the right not to speak outside the presence of counsel.
In dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, objected to the majoritys definition of offense and adoption of the Blockburger test, arguing that the majoritys definition undermined the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Conceding the majoritys point that its own proposed test lacks the precision for which police officers may hope and requires the lower courts to specify its meaning further in individualized cases, the dissent called for a test that defines an offense as criminal acts that are closely related to or inextricably intertwined with the particular crime set forth in the charging instrument. The dissent also criticized the concurring opinion, noting that unlike Justice Kennedy, the majority does not call Jackson itself into question.
Comment: This is one of several cases from the 2000-2001 term in which the Court seems genuinely miffed at lower federal courts for not following Supreme Court precedent.