Criminal Law Summaries
FindLaw > Criminal Law Summaries > Alabama v. Bozeman
Interstate Agreement On Detainers Antishuttling Provision
Case: Alabama v. Bozeman
Issue: Does Article IV(e) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers bar further criminal proceedings against a defendant who was brought to the receiving State for one day (in order to be arraigned) and returned to the original place of imprisonment before trial in the receiving State began?
Facts: The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (Agreement), 18 U.S.C. App. § 2, creates uniform procedures for lodging and executing detainers. A detainer is a legal order that requires a State in which an individual is currently imprisoned to hold that individual when he has finished serving his sentence so that he may be tried by a different State for a different crime. Forty-eight states, the federal government, and the District of Columbia have entered the Agreement. The Agreement, the purpose of which was to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of [outstanding] charges and determine the proper status of detainers, provides: (1) a prisoner with the right to demand a trial within 180 days (unless extended by the trial court for good cause) after a detainer has been lodged against him; and (2) the receiving State [the State in which the outstanding charge is pending] with the right to obtain the prisoner for purposes of trial, so long as that State tries the prisoner within 120 days (unless extended by the trial court for good cause shown) of his or her arrival and does not return the prisoner to the sending State during that time. This latter requirement, an antishuttling provision contained in Article IV(e) of the Agreement, specifically requires that if a trial is not conducted prior to the prisoners return to the original place of imprisonment, any indictment or complaint entered against the Defendant in the receiving State shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
Respondent Michael Bozeman was serving a sentence in federal prison in Marianna, Florida when the district attorney for Covington County, Alabama (who had earlier lodged a detainer against Bozeman in connection with charges relating to firearms), sought temporary custody pursuant to the Agreement in order to arraign Bozeman on those charges and to secure his appointment of counsel. Federal authorities released Bozeman to local authorities, who then delivered him to Covington County, roughly 80 miles from the federal prison. Bozeman, who spent one night in county jail, appeared in court and obtained appointed counsel the next day. That evening, he was returned to federal prison. One month later, Bozeman was brought back to Covington County for trial.
Bozemans counsel filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Bozeman had been returned to the original place of imprisonment prior to trial in violation of the Agreements antishuttling provision. As a result, under Article IV(e), the charges brought against Bozeman by Covington County were without any further force or effect, thus requiring the court to enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. The trial court refused and Bozeman subsequently was convicted. An intermediate State Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, but the Alabama Supreme Court reversed. It concluded that the literal language of the Agreement required the dismissal of the state charges.
Holding: The language of Article IV(e) of the Agreement bars further criminal proceedings where the prisoner has been returned to the sending State prior to trial, even where the prisoner has been retained in the receiving State only for one day.
Reasoning: Justice Breyer delivered the Courts opinion. The Court rejected the States argument that the violation of the antishuttling provision was a mere technicality, instead concluding that Article IV(e)s absolute language militated against any de minimus exception. Article IV(e) says that when a prisoner is returned before trial the pertinent charging instrument shall not be of any further force or effect, and the Court shall enter an order dismissing the claim with prejudice. Art. IV(e) (emphasis added). Moreover, the Agreement makes no distinction among different kinds of IV(c) arrivals, say, by exempting those that are followed by return within a short, specified period of time, or those that are simply for the purpose of arraignment. Given the Agreements absolute language, the Court likewise rejected claims that, because Bozemans return to federal prison was helpful to Bozeman, Article IV(e) should not be used to bar further criminal proceedings. [T]he parties would more appropriately address these policy arguments to legislatures. The Court also held inapplicable a statutory provision that provided a court with discretion to dismiss such proceedings with or without prejudice. See 18 U.S.C. App. § 9(1). That provision, the Court explained, applies only where the United States was the receiving State. In the case at hand, the United States was the sending State.
In Part II(B) of Breyers opinion, joined by all of the Justices except Scalia and Thomas, the Court also held that even if Article IV(e) were to have a de minimus exception, the violation in the case at had was not de minimus. Rejecting characterizations of the antishuttling provision as a mere effort to prevent the interruption of a prisoners rehabilitation, the Court observed that a provision that prevents returning a prisoner who has arrived in the receiving State does not directly increase the number of days the prisoner will spend in rehabilitation in the sending State. Rather, it directly and intentionally decreases the number of days. Therefore, the anti-shuttling provision is not meant to prevent interruption of a prisoners rehabilitation in the manner suggested by Alabama and the Solicitor General. Article VI(e)s requirement that the prisoner remain in the county jail means that the prisoner will spend all of those 120 days away from the sending States rehabilitation programs.
However, Article IV(e) may seek to remove obstructions to prisoner rehabilitation in a different way. The Court observed that the requirement that a prisoner remain within the receiving State creates an incentive for that State to shorten the pretrial period since the State must pay for costs incurred through the prisoners custody. By returning Bozeman to federal prison, Covington County circumvented this statutorily-created incentive by saving itself those custodial costs for a nontrivial several week period. Alternatively, the Court speculated that the Agreements drafters may have considered that shuttling itself adds to the uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Thus, the drafters may have sought to minimize shuttling for that reason alone. Construing the Agreement under either of these rationales, we cannot say that the one-day violation here is de minimus, technical, or harmless. Moreover, [g]iven the Agreements absolute language, it is enough to explain why Alabamas view of the Agreements purpose is not plausible and to point to other purposes more easily squared with Article IV(e)s text and operation.
Other Opinions: None.
Comment: The Courts decision comes as no surprise in light of the statutes textual commands. Most federal prosecutors have assumed for years that the Agreements strictures regarding antishuttling were to be literally construed.