Criminal Law Summaries
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Habeas Corpus Definition Of Properly Filed Under 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(2)
Case: Artuz v. Bennett
Issue: 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), a federal habeasstatute, provides that [t]he time during which a properlyfiled application for State post-conviction or other collateralreview . . . is pending shall not be counted toward any period oflimitation under this subsection. This case presents the questionwhether an application for state post-conviction relief containingclaims that are procedurally barred [under relevant state law] isproperly filed within the meaning of thisprovision.
Facts: In 1984, Tony Bennett was convicted of variouscrimes in Queens County, New York. In 1995, after unsuccessfullyseeking state post-conviction relief on a previous occasion,Bennett moved to vacate his initial conviction. By oral decision onNovember 30, 1995, the trial court denied Bennetts motion tovacate. Bennett claims never to have received a copy of awritten order reflecting the denial, despite several writtenrequests.
On April 4, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death PenaltyAct of 1996 (AEDPA) became effective. The AEDPA contains a one-yearperiod of limitation on habeas corpus actions by state prisoners.After this provision took effect, the United States Court ofAppeals for the Second Circuit recognized a one-year grace period,in addition to the one-year statute of limitations set forth in theAEDPA, in which it would permit state prisoners challengingpre-AEDPA convictions to file habeas corpus petitions.
In February 1998, Bennett filed a petition for habeas review inthe United States District Court for the Eastern District of NewYork. Bennett alleged, inter alia, that he had beendeprived of his right to a fair trial, due process, andconstitutionally effective counsel. Because the AEDPA provided foronly a one-year statute of limitations, the District Courtdismissed this petition as untimely.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuitreversed the District Courts dismissal. The panel determinedthat Bennetts 1995 motion to vacate was still pending becausehe never received a copy of the relevant written order and,therefore, could not appeal that judgment. The panel then concludedthat §2244(d)(2), which tolls the AEDPAs one-yearstatute of limitations once an application for statepost-conviction relief has been filed, also tolls the one-yeargrace period afforded by the Second Circuit to prisonerschallenging pre-AEDPA convictions. Finally, the panel decided thatBennetts 1995 motion to vacate was a properlyfiled application for state post-conviction relief within themeaning of §2244(d)(2). It rejected Petitioner Artuzscontention that the application was not properly filedbecause the claims it contained were subject to two procedural barsunder New York law. Specifically, New York law prohibitedBennett from raising an issue previously determined on the meritsthrough appellate review and from raising an available claim notpreviously addressed because of the defendantsunjustifiable failure.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whetherBennetts 1995 motion to vacate was properly filedwithin the meaning of §2244(d)(2).
Holding: The alleged failure of Bennettsapplication to comply with New York State procedural requirementsthat would bar review of the merits of the application does notrender the application improperly filed for purposes of§2244(d)(2).
Reasoning: The Court, in a unanimous opinion by JusticeScalia, reasoned that the question whether an application hasbeen properly filed is quite distinct from the questionwhether the claims contained in the application are meritorious andfree of procedural bar. In accordance with the common usageof the term, an application is filed whendelivered to, and accepted by, the appropriate court officerfor placement into the official record. An application isproperly filed when its delivery and acceptanceare in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governingfilings.
Petitioner Artuz argued that tolling the statute of limitationsfor procedurally barred state habeas applications failed to promote§ 2244(d)(2)s objective of requiring convictedindividuals to exhaust all available state law remedies. Whatevermerit such a policy argument may have, it is not the provinceof this Court to rewrite the statute to accommodate [it].
Other Opinions: None.
Comment: The Court made clear that the proper ministerialprocedures for filing had to be followed under§2242(d)(2). Once that filing, according to procedures, wasmade, however, the application was properly filed evenif the applicants request for relief on the merits was notreached based on state criminal procedural grounds.