FindLaw > Criminal Law Summaries > Slack v. McDaniel

ANTI-TERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996 — RULES GOVERNING APPEALS

Case:Slack v. McDaniel

Issue:

1. When an appeal by a habeas petitioner is filed after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, is the right to an appeal governed by the AEDPA even if the original habeas petition was filed before the effective date of the statute?
2. If AEDPA does control the proceedings on appeal, may a certificate of appealability issue under 28 U.S.C. 2253(c) (Supp. III 1997) when the district court dismissed the petition on procedural grounds?
3. Is a habeas petition "second or successive" when it is filed after an initial dismissal without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies?

Facts: Slack was convicted of second degree murder in Nevada. His direct appeal failed, and in 1991, he filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. §2254. The Federal District Court dismissed the petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies. Following unsuccessful state proceedings, Slack filed a new petition in federal court in 1995 which raised issues not discussed in his 1991 petition. The District Court dismissed the 1995 petition on two grounds. First, it held that the petition was a "second or successive petition" even though his 1991 petition had been dismissed without prejudice. It then invoked the abuse of writ doctrine to dismiss with prejudice the claims Slack had not raised in the 1991 petition. Second, the court concluded that of the remaining claims one had not been presented to the state courts. The court, therefore, dismissed these claims as a mixed petition.

The dismissal order by the District Court was filed on March 30, 1998. On April 29, 1998, Slack filed a pleading captioned "Notice of Appeal." The court treated the notice as an application for a certificate of probable cause (CPC) under the pre-AEDPA version of 28 U.S.C. §2253. A CPC was denied by both the District Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on the grounds that the appeal would raise no substantial issues.

Slack sought certiorari in the Supreme Court, arguing that he was entitled to an appeal of the dismissal of his petition because the District Court was wrong to hold that his 1995 petition was "second or successive." (Slack did not challenge the District Court’s ruling that his 1995 petition was mixed.)

Holding:

1. A habeas petitioner’s right to appeal is governed by the AEDPA if the appeal is filed after the effective date of the AEDPA, regardless of whether the original habeas petition was filed in district court before or after the effective date.
2. When a habeas petition is denied on procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability should issue if the prisoner can make a substantial showing that reasonable jurists would find it debatable that a constitutional right has been violated and that reasonable jurists would find it debatable that the court’s denial of the petition on procedural grounds was incorrect.
3. A habeas petition that is filed after an initial dismissal without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies is a not "second or successive petition." (This substantive legal question was governed by pre-AEDPA law, since it implicated Slack’s "right to relief in the trial court" where he had filed the 1995 petition prior to the effective date of the AEDPA.

Reasoning:

AEDPA Governs Appeals

The AEDPA governs appeals filed after the effective date of the statute because while an appeal is a continuation of litigation started in the trial court, it is a distinct step. Proceedings in the courts of appeals are referred to as appellate cases, and as such, an appellate case filed after the effective date of the AEDPA is governed by its provisions, regardless of when the trial court reached its decision.

Because the AEDPA applied, the Court of Appeals should have treated Slack’s April 29, 1998 notice of appeal as an application for a Certificate of Appealability (COA), as required by the AEDPA, rather than as an application for a certificate for probable cause (CPC) under pre-AEDPA law.

Issuing a Certificate of Appealability

Under the AEDPA, a COA may issue only upon the "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." In Slack’s case, however, the court dismissed the petition on procedural grounds without discussing the merits of his appeal. The state argued that this procedural ruling barred Slack from seeking further appeals. The Court rejected this argument, noting that it would deny a remedy to a prisoner who could demonstrate that he was convicted in violation of the Constitution but whose petition for relief was decided on erroneous procedural grounds. Such a position would weaken the vital role habeas corpus plays in protecting constitutional rights, and there is no indication that Congress, when drafting the requirements for issuing a COA, intended to allow procedural error to bar vindication of substantial constitutional rights on appeal.

Therefore, under the AEDPA, when a district court has rejected a habeas petition on procedural grounds, a COA may issue if the prisoner can show two things. First, he must show that reasonable jurists would find it debatable that there has been a violation of a substantial constitutional right. Second, he must show that reasonable jurists would find it debatable whether the district court made an error in the procedural ruling.

Second and Successive Petitions

Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts states: "A second or successive petition [alleging new claims] may be dismissed if … the judge finds that the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ." This rule applies only to petitions which are second or successive. Thus, the question is whether Slack’s 1995 petition which followed his initial petition (which was dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies) was second or successive.

In Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), the Court held that a federal court must dismiss habeas petitions that contain both exhausted and unexhausted claims. The ruling left open, however, the option for the prisoner to return to federal court after the requisite exhaustion. Only when a prisoner declines to return to state court and chooses instead to proceed with his exhausted claims in federal court is there the possibility that a subsequent petition may be considered second or successive and subject to dismissal as an abuse of the writ. Since "[n]o claim made in Slack’s 1991 petition was adjudicated during the three months it was pending in federal court," his 1995 petition was not "second or successive."

The state argued that when returning to federal court after state exhaustion, Slack should be limited to those claims made in his initial 1991 petition. Otherwise, it claimed, the prisoner would be allowed to return to federal court and file a new mixed petition, thereby causing the process to begin a new. This would inject undue delay into the collateral review process. The Court rejected this argument, noting that the states could still impose procedural bars to restrict repeated returns to state court after initial postconviction hearings. Moreover, the Court stated that such a rule would bar the prisoner from raising nonfrivolous claims developed in subsequent state exhaustion proceedings even though the federal court had not reviewed a single constitutional claim. Since initial federal petitions are often made in "uncounselled, handwritten" pleadings which are pending in federal court only until a state has identified one unexhausted claim, the rule could potentially "trap the unwary pro se prisoner".

Other Opinions: Justices Souter and Breyer joined Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion. Stevens disagreed with the majority’s ruling that the AEDPA’s amendments to 28 U.S.C. §2253 govern an appeal in a habeas corpus proceeding that began prior to the effective date of the AEDPA. With respect to the balance of the majority’s opinion and judgment, the justices concurred.

Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s dissent from the Court’s ruling that Slack’s 1995 petition was not a second or successive petition. The holding in Rose v. Lundy, they argued, was much more narrow than the majority’s reading and only stated that a mixed petition must be dismissed. When a prisoner returns to federal court after state exhaustion, it is a renewal of the first petition and therefore a second or successive petition.