FindLaw > Criminal Law Summaries > Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California

RIGHT OF SELF-REPRESENTATION — APPEAL

Case: Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District

Issue: Does a defendant's constitutional right to represent himself during a criminal trial as established in  Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), extend to the appellate process?

Facts: While working as a paralegal, Martinez was accused of converting $6,000 of a client’s money into his own. He was charged with grand theft and embezzlement. Choosing to represent himself at trial because no "attorney on earth" would believe his innocence given his past criminal record, Martinez was acquitted of grand theft and convicted of embezzlement. Under the California three-strikes law, the court imposed a mandatory 25 years-to-life sentence. Martinez filed a timely appeal, as well as a motion to represent himself and a waiver of counsel. The California Court of Appeal denied his motion, and, after the California Supreme Court declined to issue an opinion, certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court.

Holding: Neither the holding in Faretta nor its reasoning supports a constitutional right to represent oneself on appeal from a criminal conviction.

Reasoning: The Court, through Justice Stevens, noted that the Faretta ruling was limited only to an individual's right to represent himself during a criminal trial. Nothing in the holding itself, therefore, requires that this right be extended to appeals. Moreover, the reasoning of Faretta was based on three arguments which are not persuasive in the context of appeals.

First, Faretta was based in part on historical evidence that the right of a defendant to represent himself at trial had been protected since the beginning of the nation. In colonial times, however, this right was important primarily because lawyers were "scarce, often mistrusted and not readily available to the average person." Denying the right to pro se representation, therefore, often was equivalent to denying the opportunity to present any defense. Today, however, the right to state appointed counsel in criminal trial proceedings has been recognized. See  Gideon v. Wainwright 372 U.S. 335 (1963). When a defendant elects to represent himself, therefore, it is more likely because of a desire to "conduct his own cause in his own words" rather than because self-representation is the only alternative to no representation at all. The Court concluded, therefore, that the historical evidence relied upon in Faretta is not as persuasive in today’s context for both criminal trials and appeals. Moreover, the historical evidence in Faratta centers around criminal trails. It cannot be said that there is a long historical tradition of the right to represent oneself on appeal, as the right to any appeal is itself relatively new and is a creature of statute.

Second, Faretta also relied upon the structure of the Sixth Amendment which provides the right to counsel in all criminal prosecutions. The Court has recognized that the Sixth Amendment does not create a right to appeal. It "necessarily follows that the Amendment itself does not provide any basis for finding a right to self-representation on appeal."

Third, Faretta was based on respect for individual autonomy, and noted that it is unfair to force upon a defendant a lawyer appointed by the same government who is prosecuting him. In so ruling, the Faretta Court found that the individual autonomy of the defendant outweighs the state’s interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial. While recognizing that the right to represent oneself on appeal also involves issues of autonomy, the Court here held that appeals are fundamentally different from trials and therefore require a different balancing of the individual and state interests. From the state’s viewpoint, the purpose of a trial is to find an individual presumed innocent guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. An appeal, on the other hand, is usually initiated by the defendant and is an attempt to overturn a finding of guilt. Thus, the Court concluded that given "the change in position from defendant to appellant, the autonomy interests that survive a felony conviction are less compelling than those motivating the decision in Faretta. Yet the overriding state interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice remains as strong as at the trial level." States are therefore within their discretion to deny the right to self-representation at the appellate level.

Other Opinions: Justices Kennedy and Breyer joined Justice Stevens' opinion, but also wrote brief separate concurring opinions. Justice Kennedy wrote separately stressing that "[t]o resolve this case it is unnecessary to cast doubt upon the rationale of  Faretta v. California." Justice Breyer noted that although Faretta has been criticized for undermining the fairness of a trial when a defendant represents himself, there is no empirical evidence to suggest that pro se representation harms a defendant. As such, Breyer wrote, there is no reason to reconsider the constitutional assumptions upon which Faretta is based. Justice Scalia, concurring only in the judgment, derided the majority's skepticism concerning Faretta. "I have no doubt that the Framers of our Constitution . . . would not have found acceptable the compulsory assignment of counsel by the Government to plead a criminal defendant's case." Scalia opined that since there is no constitutional right to an appeal, there is a fortiori no constitutional right to represent oneself on appeal.