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FEDERAL ARSON — APPLICABILITY TO PRIVATE RESIDENCES

Case: Jones v. United States

Issue: Does arson of an owner-occupied private residence fall within the ambit of 18 U.S.C. §844(i), which makes it a federal crime to maliciously damage by means of fire "any building . . . or other real . . . property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce"?

Facts: Jones threw a Molotov cocktail into the home of his cousin, causing severe damage to the building. He was convicted under 18 U.S.C. §844(i), which makes it a federal crime to "maliciously damag[e] or destro[y],…by means of fire or an explosive, any building used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce." He received a sentence of 35 years in prison, followed by 5 years of supervised release. He appealed his conviction, arguing that 18 U.S.C. §844(i), as applied to the arson of a private dwelling, exceeded Congress’ Commerce Clause powers. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

Holding: "[A]n owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial purpose does not qualify as property ‘used’ in commerce or commerce-affecting activity" and therefore is not covered by 18 U.S.C. §844(i).

Reasoning: The Court first rejected the argument that Congress invoked its full power under the Commerce Clause in drafting 18 U.S.C. §844(i). Congress did not define the crime described in the statute to cover the explosion of a building whose damage or destruction might affect interstate commerce. Rather it used the qualifying phrase "used in" a commerce-affecting activity and required "that the damaged or destroyed property must itself have been used in commerce or in an activity affecting commerce." To the Court, "[t]he key word is ‘used.’" Thus, Congress looked to the function of the building and "whether that function affects interstate commerce."

The government argued that the private residence in question was used in interstate commerce in three ways. First, it was used as collateral to secure a mortgage from an Oklahoma lender. Second, it was used to obtain casualty insurance from a Wisconsin insurer. Finally, it was used to receive natural gas from sources outside Indiana. The Court rejected each of these explanations, stating that the phrase "used in" means active employment. The house was not actively employed in securing the mortgage, obtaining insurance and receiving natural gas. Instead, the home’s only active employment "was for the everyday living of [the defendant’s] cousin and his family." In this sense, this case is different from Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858 (1985), in which the Court held that a defendant who sets fire to an apartment building may be charged under 18 U.S.C. §844(i) because renting apartments is a commercial venture.

The Court also noted that the government’s interpretation would subject nearly every building to 18 U.S.C. §844(i), thereby making any crime of arson a federal crime. Because arson is primarily a local concern and the link between private residences and commercial activity is not clear, the constitutionality of such an interpretation is questionable. Therefore, in light of "the concerns brought to the fore" in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), which invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act because it exceeded Congress’ Commerce Clause authority, the Court is obligated under the interpretive rule of DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988) (constitutionally doubtful constructions should be avoided), to reject the government’s interpretation. "[W]here a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter." (Quoting United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408(1909)). Given this principle, if Congress wants to make a crime that is traditionally handled by the states a federal crime, it must do so with "language that is clear and definite."

Other Opinions: Justice Thomas joined Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion which emphasized that federal laws which "overlap with state authority" must be interpreted narrowly "unless congressional intention to assert its jurisdiction is plain."

Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion which noted that the decision in this case expressed no view on whether 18 U.S.C. §844(i) is constitutional "in its application to all buildings used for commercial activities."