FindLaw > Criminal Law Summaries > New York v. Hill

INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS — WAIVER OF RIGHT TO TIMELY TRIAL

Case: New York v. Hill

Issue: Does a defendant waive his right to a timely trial under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) when his lawyer agrees to a trial date later than that required by the IAD?

Facts: Under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), a "congressionally sanctioned interstate compact" among 48 States, the United States and the District of Columbia, a State seeking to bring charges against a prisoner in another State’s custody may request that the institution where the prisoner is housed detain the prisoner or notify the requesting State when release of the prisoner is imminent. After a request is made, under Article III of the IAD, the prisoner may file a request for final disposition of all charges. Upon such a request, the IAD requires that the prisoner be brought to trial within 180 days, except that "for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any reasonable or necessary continuance."

New York lodged a detainer against Hill who was a prisoner in Ohio. Hill signed a request for the disposition of the detainer pursuant to Article III of the IAD and was returned to New York to face murder and robbery charges.

On January 9, 1995, the prosecutor and defense counsel appeared in court to set the trial date. The prosecutor suggested a date of May 1, 1995. The defense counsel for Hill told the trail judge that this date was "fine."

On April 17, 1995, Hill moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the IAD’s time period of 180 days had expired. The trial court denied the motion, holding that Hill had waived this right when his lawyer agreed to a trial date outside that time period. Hill was then convicted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that Hill did not waive his rights to a speedy trial under the IAD.

Holding: Defense counsel may effectively waive the right to a timely trial guaranteed under the IAD by agreeing to a later trial date. No affirmative request is required on the part of the defendant to waive this right beyond his counsel’s agreement to a later trial.

Reasoning: The Court began by reaffirming its general rule presuming the availability of waiver "in the context of a broad array of constitutional and statutory provisions." While certain fundamental rights, such as the right to counsel, require that the defendant personally make an informed waiver, other rights may be waived through the action of the defendant’s counsel. Scheduling matters fall into the latter category because they are central to trial strategy. Defense counsel, the Court reasoned, is in the best position to determine if the defendant’s interests are best served by pushing for a speedy trial or by delaying. Waiver of the right to a speedy trial, therefore, can be effected through the decision of counsel.

Moreover, the IAD states that good-cause continuances can be granted with either the "prisoner or his counsel" present. Thus, the IAD contemplates that decisions regarding the scheduling of trial may be made by the defense counsel without an affirmative statement from the defendant.

The Court rejected Hill’s argument that the "good-cause continuances" provision of the IAD is the exclusive method for waiving the IAD’s timely trial limit: This "necessary or reasonable continuance" provision is only directed toward situations where the defendant opposes the prosecution’s request for extension of time. It does not speak to agreed-upon extensions.

Hill also argued that the right to a timely trial under the IAD benefits society generally and therefore cannot be waived. The Court conceded that the IAD’s time limits confer a societal benefit, but noted that waiver is still permissible unless "such waiver of release contravenes the statutory policy." The societal benefits of having a timely trial under the IAD are not as great as they are in the general case of a speedy trial. The defendant, for example, is already detained in another state and therefore there is not a need to prevent future criminal activity. Thus, "it cannot be argued that society’s interest in the prompt resolution of outstanding charges is so central to the IAD that it is part of the unalterable ‘statutory policy.’"

Hill finally argued that waiver under the IAD requires an "affirmative request" by defense counsel, rather than the mere acquiescence involved in his case. The Court rejected this hypertechnical distinction, pointing out that dismissing an indictment because defense counsel passively agreed to a trial date beyond the specified 180 day limit would allow defendants to "escape justice by willingly accepting treatment inconsistent with the IAD’s time limits and then recanting later on."