FindLaw > Criminal Law Summaries > Edwards v. Carpenter

HABEAS CORPUS — INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS "CAUSE" OF PROCEDURE DEFAULT

Case: Edwards v. Carpenter

Issue: Whether a federal habeas court is barred from considering an ineffective assistance of counsel claim as cause for the state level procedural default of another claim when the ineffective assistance claim has itself been procedurally defaulted at the state level.

Facts: Carpenter pled guilty to aggravated murder and aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 30 years for the aggravated murder count and a concurrent term of 10-to-25 years for aggravated robbery. On direct appeal while represented by new counsel, Carpenter’s only argument was that the evidence offered in mitigation established that he should be eligible for parole after 20 years. His appeal was rejected by the Ohio Court of Appeals and certiorari was denied by the Ohio Supreme Court.

After exhausting state post-conviction relief while representing himself, Carpenter filed an application with the Ohio Court of Appeals to reopen his direct appeal on the ground that his original appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to raise a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence on direct appeal. The application was dismissed because Carpenter failed to show good cause for failing to bring this new filing within the 90-day period mandated by Ohio procedure.

In reviewing Carpenter’s petition for federal habeas relief, the district court found that Carpenter’s sufficiency of the evidence claim was procedurally defaulted, but that his ineffectiveness of counsel claim showed cause for this default. In so holding, the court recognized that the ineffectiveness of counsel claim had been dismissed on procedural grounds because it was not filed within the 90 day period. However, the court held that application of this rule by Ohio courts was inconsistent and therefore not a bar to federal relief. The district court also found that counsel had been constitutionally ineffective and therefore ordered a writ of habeas corpus conditioned upon the reopening of his direct appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the ineffectiveness of counsel claim served as cause to excuse the failure to raise the sufficiency of the evidence claim, whether or not the former had been procedurally defaulted, because Carpenter had exhausted the ineffectiveness of counsel claim by presenting it to the state court in his petition to reopen the direct appeal.

Holding: Ineffectiveness of counsel can serve as cause for procedural default of another constitutional claim. However, this is only the case when the ineffectiveness of counsel claim has not also been procedurally defaulted. In other words, the claim must be presented to the state courts in accordance with the state’s procedural requirements. Because Carpenter failed to present his claim within the required 90 day period, it was procedurally defaulted. The decision of the Sixth Circuit was therefore reversed and remanded in order for that court to determine if Carpenter could satisfy the "cause and prejudice" standard with respect to his failure to timely raise the ineffectiveness of counsel claim, or if he could show that Ohio’s 90 day rule, because it is inconsistently applied in Ohio, does not constitute an adequate procedural ground to bar federal habeas review of Carpenter’s ineffective assistance claim.

Reasoning:  Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) held that any claim raised in a federal habeas petition must first be raised in state court. Moreover, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be raised as an independent constitutional claim before it can be used to establish cause for procedural default.

The purpose of the exhaustion requirement of Carrier is to preserve the state’s right to review and correct its own mistakes. This purpose would be "utterly defeated" if a prisoner were able to seek federal relief simply by letting the "time run" on his state claims. While in such a case there indeed would be no state claims available, the state has not been given a fair opportunity to rule on the claims. Thus, the principles of federalism and comity require that any ineffectiveness of counsel argument which will be used as cause for another procedural default must be raised in state court in a procedurally acceptable manner. In this case, Carpenter failed to raise the ineffectiveness of counsel claim within the required 90 days in state court. He is therefore procedurally defaulted from using this claim to show cause for his procedural default of another claim.

The Court noted that the procedural default of Carpenter’s ineffectiveness of counsel claim may itself be excused if he can meet the cause and prejudice standard with respect to this claim. Since this issue was not argued by Carpenter, the Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Other Opinions: Justices Breyer and Stevens concurred in the judgment, agreeing that the case must be remanded to the Sixth Circuit. Breyer and Stevens, however, agreed with the Sixth Circuit’s ruling that the ineffectiveness of counsel claim was not procedurally defaulted, because it had in fact been presented to the state courts. The issue for remand, therefore, should be whether counsel was indeed ineffective in his failure to raise the sufficiency of evidence claim.