18 U.S.C. § 924(C) — ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE
Case: Castillo v. United States
Issue: 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1) prohibits the use or carrying of a firearm during a crime of violence and increases the penalty when the weapon used or carried is a machinegun. Does the word "machinegun" create a separate offense or a sentencing factor?
Facts: A jury found that members of the Branch-Davidian religious sect, involved in a violent confrontation with federal agents, had knowingly used or carried a firearm during and in relation to the commission of a crime of violence. "At sentencing, the judge found that the ‘firearms’ at issue included certain machineguns . . . and hand grenades that the defendants actually or constructively had possessed." The judge therefore sentenced these defendants to thirty years, under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Section 924(c)(1), at the time of petitioners’ trial, provided in pertinent part that: "Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence . . . , uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence . . . , be sentenced to imprisonment for five years, and if the firearm is a short barreled rifle [or a] short barreled shotgun to imprisonment for ten years, and if the firearm is a machinegun, or a destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, to imprisonment for thirty years." The defendants had only been charged with and convicted by the jury of using or carrying a firearm, which mandated a five year sentence, while the judge found that the firearm in question was a machinegun, resulting in a thirty year sentence. [It is well settled that the portion of § 924(c)(1) mandating an extra five year sentence for using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence is a separate offense rather than a sentencing factor.] The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that "statutory words such as ‘machinegun’ create sentencing factors, i.e., factors that enhance a sentence, not elements of a separate crime . . ." Hence, it specified that the jury "was not required" to determine whether petitioners used or carried "machineguns" or other enhanced weapons. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the differing views in the United States Courts of Appeals as to whether the statutory word "machinegun" and similar words contained in § 924(c)(1) refer to sentencing factors to be determined by a judge or create new crimes to be determined by a jury.
Holding: 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1) "uses the word ‘machinegun’ (and similar words) to state an element of a separate offense."
Reasoning: Justice Breyer, who delivered the opinion of the Court, was joined by the rest of the justices, except for Justice Scalia as to the fourth point of Part II, discussing legislative history. Breyer explained that while the literal language of the statute appears neutral, its "overall structure" promotes the idea that the statute creates separate offenses for a jury to decide. Moreover, Breyer denied that courts typically used firearm types as sentencing factors. He next noted that asking a jury to decide whether a defendant used or carried a particular type of firearm would "rarely complicate a trial or risk unfairness," while "a contrary rule–one that leaves the machinegun matter to the sentencing judge–might unnecessarily produce a conflict between the judge and the jury." Justice Breyer stressed that the legislative history of the statute was somewhat ambiguous. Even though some of this history focuses on sentencing factors, this is not dispositive, "because the statute’s basic ‘uses or carries a firearm’ provision [which is clearly a separate crime] also dealt primarily with sentencing." Finally, he noted that insofar as the Court remained uncertain as to Congress’ intent, "the length and severity of an added mandatory sentence that turns on the presence or absence of a ‘machinegun’…weights in favor of treating such offense-related words as referring to an element" describing a separate offense.
Comment: The Court also noted, though it did not explicitly base its decision on this point, that "treating facts that lead to an increase in the maximum sentence as a sentencing factor would give rise to significant constitutional questions." This is the doctrine of "constitutional doubt." In Apprendi v. New Jersey, also decided in the October 1999 Term, the Court explicitly held that any factor, other than recidivism, which enhances a statutory maximum must be decided by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, had Congress actually intended the machinegun enhancement in § 924(c)(1) to be a sentencing factor, the Court would have arguably invalidated it on constitutional grounds.