FindLaw > Criminal Law Summaries > Apprendi v. New Jersey

DUE PROCESS — INCREASING THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE BASED ON FACTS NOT FOUND BY A JURY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT

Case: Apprendi v. New Jersey

Issue: "The question presented is whether the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a factual determination authorizing an increase in the maximum prison sentence for an offense from 10 to 20 years be made by a jury on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt."

Facts: A New Jersey "hate crime" statute extends the authorized prison term for second degree felonies (5 to 10 years) by "between 10 and 20" years if the trial judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant acted with the intent to intimidate the victim because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity.

Petitioner Apprendi fired several shots into the home of an African-American family which had recently moved into an all-white neighborhood. Apprendi made a statement to the police that he fired the shots because he did not want African-Americans living in the neighborhood. He later retracted that statement. Apprendi pleaded guilty to two second-degree felony counts of possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose and one third degree felony count of unlawful possession of an antipersonnel bomb. Later, the trial judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime was motivated by a racial bias. He therefore enhanced Apprendi’s punishment and sentenced him to 12 years in prison on one of the second-degree felony counts and lesser concurrent sentences on the other counts.

Apprendi appealed, arguing that the Due Process clause required a finding by a jury of racial bias beyond a reasonable doubt before his sentence could be enhanced beyond 10 years. The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey upheld the enhanced sentence, and the State Supreme Court affirmed.

Holding: Any fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction, "that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."

Reasoning: The count for which Apprendi received a 12 year sentence carries a maximum of 10 years imprisonment. Application of the hate crime law to this case, therefore, extended Apprendi’s punishment beyond the statutory maximum. As held in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999), the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the notice and jury guarantees of the Sixth Amendment require that any fact which increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The only exception to this rule is a fact regarding a prior conviction. Thus, the question of Apprendi’s racial motivation must be sent to the jury.

Although  McMillan v. Pennsylvania 477 U.S. 79 (1986) allowed judges to consider certain facts not found by a jury when determining a sentence, the sentencing scheme in that case only concerned a judge’s ability to use discretion in selecting a sentence somewhere within the statutory minimum and maximum terms. Thus, because the sentencing factors did not increase the maximum sentence under statute, allowing such facts to be determined by a preponderance of the evidence did not violate the Constitution. This is different from the New Jersey hate crime law which increases the maximum punishment above statutory limits.

Finally, New Jersey’s law essentially converts a jury’s finding of guilt for a lesser crime into a punishment equal to what the state would impose for a more serious crime. The essential element of the more serious crime — the racial bias — is not found by a jury. Thus, the defendant is sentenced based on elements not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. It therefore does not matter that the state placed the hate crime law in the criminal code’s sentencing provisions. The law still constitutes an essential element of a crime for which strong punishments are assessed. This element must consequently be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

Other Opinions: Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia concurred in the opinion, endorsing a broad common law approach to determining whether a judge may use facts not determined by a jury to increase a defendant’s sentence, rather than the multi-factor parsing of statutes as set forth in McMillan. Under the common law approach, each fact that is the basis for imposing or increasing a punishment is an element of the crime which must go before the jury. Justices O’Connor, Rehnquist, Kennedy and Breyer dissented, arguing that factors which increase the punishment for a crime are not constitutionally required to be tried by the jury. Rather, the dissenters thought that the New Jersey law was similar to the one in question in McMillan, and as such, that racial bias should be considered a sentencing factor, not an element.

Comments: This decision could have a dramatic impact on the law of federal sentencing, including application of the federal sentencing guidelines, and may result in the re-sentencing of thousands of criminal defendants.