FindLaw > Criminal Law Summaries > 1998 Index > Wilson v. Layne

Case: Wilson v. Layne

Issue: Does the State violate the Fourth Amendment by allowing media representatives to accompany police officers during the execution of search and arrest warrants in private homes?

Facts: Armed Deputy United States Marshals and Montgomery County Police Officers in possession of arrest warrants entered a private dwelling in order to effectuate the arrest of suspect Dominic Wilson. As part of a media ride-along program, a Washington Post photographer and reporter were present in the home. Unbeknownst to the officers, the home was that of the suspect's parents, and the suspect was not present. The attempted arrest was conducted in the early morning hours. The suspect's parents (petitioners) were roused from bed in their nightclothes. The suspect's father was physically restrained. The officers departed when they realized they had the wrong home. Petitioners sued the officers under Bivens and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The District Court denied respondents' motion for summary judgment which was based on a claim of qualified immunity. An interlocutory appeal was taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit where the en banc court ultimately upheld the defense of qualified immunity, refusing to reach the Fourth Amendment issue.

Holding: It is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for law enforcement officers to bring members of the media or other third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of the third parties in the home is not in aid of the execution of the warrant. Since this Fourth Amendment violation was not clearly established in 1992, the officers who executed the warrant were entitled to qualified immunity.

Reasoning: Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court on the Fourth Amendment issue, based his decision on the primacy of common law and Fourth Amendment respect for the privacy of the home. "In 1604, an English court made the now famous observation that 'the house of everyone is to him as his castle and fortress, as well as for his defense against injury and violence as for his repose.' . . . William Blackstone noted that 'the law of England has so particular and tender a regard to the immunity of a man's house, that it stiles it his castle, and will never suffer it to be violated with impunity.' . . . The Fourth Amendment embodies this centuries-old principal of respect for the privacy of the home." Rehnquist noted that the officers had an arrest warrant and "were undoubtedly entitled to enter the Wilson home in order to execute the arrest warrant for Dominic Wilson." It was important to the Court that the presence of reporters was not related to the "objectives of the authorized intrusion." The reporters did not aid in the execution of the warrant or assist the law enforcement officers in any way. The media presence had nothing to do with the arrest of Dominic Wilson, which was the sole reason the police were in the house. The Court was careful to note that where third parties can aid in the execution of a warrant, their presence inside the home does not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation. It gave as an example the case of someone who officers need in order to identify property to be seized. The Court rejected a number of justifications for the policy of allowing the media to accompany officers in the execution of warrants, most of which were based on alleged benefits to the public and the public's right to know. To the Court, these claims ignored "the importance of the right of residential privacy at the core of the Fourth Amendment." Rehnquist noted in footnote two that the presence of the media constituted the Fourth Amendment violation, not the presence of the officers who were rightfully in the home. "We have no occasion here to decide whether the exclusionary rule would apply to any evidence discovered or developed by the media representatives." This suggests that had the police themselves discovered evidence of a crime and charged the suspect's parents, no challenge to admissibility of the evidence would have lied.

Other Opinions: Justice Stevens dissented from the portion of the Court's opinion holding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct did not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." He argued, inter alia, that every federal appellate judge who had considered the question of media presence at searches had found a Fourth Amendment violation.

Comment: It is important to remember that the Court's holding applies not only to the media, but also to any third parties whose presence does not aid in execution of the warrant.