Case: United States v. Sun Diamond Growers of California
Issue: Under 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A), the "illegal gratuity statute," must the Government establish a link between the "thing of value" conferred and a specific "official act" for or because of which it was conferred?
Facts: Respondent trade association was indicted under the illegal gratuity statute by Independent Counsel Donald Smaltz as part of his probe of former Secretary of Agriculture Mike Espy. Although the indictment referenced two matters that Sun Diamond had an interest in receiving favorable treatment upon and which were pending before the Secretary when the gratuities were given, "the indictment did not allege a specific connection between either of them... and the gratuities conferred." The trial court twice instructed the jury that "[i]t is sufficient if Sun-Diamond provided Espy with unauthorized compensation simply because he held public office," and that "[t]he government need not prove that the alleged gratuity was linked to a specific or identifiable official act or any act at all." The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed the trial court, holding that the jury instructions improperly allowed conviction based upon "evidence of gifts simply driven by Espy's official position" rather than driven by his official acts, as required by the statute. The Court of Appeals, however, rejected Sun Diamond's attack on the sufficiency of the indictment, reasoning that the United States need not prove a link between gratuities and a particular official act or acts "for or because of" which the gratuities were given: "That an official has an abundance of relevant matters upon his plate should not insulate him or his benefactors from the gratuity statute–as long as the jury is required to find the requisite intent to reward past favorable acts or to make future ones more likely." The Supreme Court affirmed only the judgment of the Court of Appeals (which had reversed the trial court and ordered a new trial on the illegal gratuity count of the indictment) and noted that the trial court, on remand, should consider whether to reopen the question of the indictment's sufficiency.
Holding: In order to establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 201(c)(1)(A), the "illegal gratuity statute" which prohibits giving, offering or promising "anything of value to any public official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official, for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such public official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official," the United States "must prove a link between a thing of value conferred upon a public official and a specific 'official act' for or because of which it was given." The Government need not establish a quid pro quo, that is, a specific intent to give a thing of value in exchange for an official act, as it must under 18 U.S.C. Section 201(b)(1) and (2), the "bribery statute." An illegal gratuity can be simply a "reward for some future act that the public official [or soon to be public official] will take (and may have already determined to take) or for a past act that he [or a former public official] has already taken." The trial court's mistaken jury instructions did not constitute harmless error.
Reasoning: Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, reached his conclusion based upon statutory analysis rather than constitutional requirements. He reasoned that the Government's reading of the statute did not "fit comfortably" with the text which "prohibits only gratuities given or received 'for or because of any official act performed or to be performed' (emphasis added). It seems to us that this means 'for or because of some particular official act of whatever identity'–just as the question 'Do you like any composer?' normally means 'Do you like some particular composer?'... Why go through the trouble of requiring that the gift be made 'for or because of any official act performed...' and then defining 'official act'... to mean 'any decision or action on any question... which may at any time be pendingŠin such official's official capacity,' when, if the Government's interpretation were correct, it would have sufficed to say 'for or because of such official's ability to favor the donor in executing the functions of his office'?" The Court also reached its conclusion because: the Government's interpretation would achieve absurd results such as the criminalization of token gifts to officials; Congress knows how to prohibit gifts given because of official status and has unambiguously done so in the past; and, a narrow reading is more consistent with the intricate web of statutory and regulatory provisions which exist in this area.
Comment: This opinion is consistent with the Court's trend in recent years of narrowly construing ambiguous federal criminal statutes.