FindLaw > Criminal Law Summaries > 1998 Index > Minnesota v. Carter

Case: Minnesota v. Carter

Issue: Whether "guests" in an apartment who had only been present a few hours, had never been to the apartment or known the tenant before, and were only there to conduct a business transaction, had a Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy with respect to a search of the apartment.

Facts: An Eagan, Minnesota police officer received a tip that the two respondents and the lessee of a ground level garden apartment were bagging white powder. The anonymous informant had seen the activity through a window. Standing outside the window and peering through a gap in the closed blinds, the officer observed the bagging activity for several minutes. He radioed headquarters, but while the affidavit was still being prepared respondents exited the apartment, got in their car and drove away. Respondents were stopped and arrested in possession of cocaine and a loaded revolver. The apartment was then searched, yielding cocaine residue and baggies. Respondents contended that the officer's initial observations constituted an illegal search and that all subsequently obtained evidence had to be suppressed under "fruit of the poisonous tree" analysis. (The trial court rejected respondents' analysis, but the Minnesota Supreme Court did not and reversed their convictions.) The record established that respondents "lived in Chicago and had come to the apartment for the sole purpose of packaging the cocaine." Respondents had no previous relationship to the tenant, had never before been in the apartment and were only there a total of 2 and one half hours. Respondents had given the tenant 2 and one half ounces of cocaine in return for use of the apartment.

Holding: Guests in an apartment who: 1)had never been there before; 2) were in the apartment for a few hours purely to conduct a business transaction; and 3)had no previous relationship with the apartment lessee, had no expectation of privacy in the apartment. Hence, any search of the apartment which may have occurred did not infringe the guests' Fourth Amendment rights.

Reasoning: Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas, reaffirmed the validity of Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) and stressed that respondents needed to have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched before their Fourth Amendment rights could attach. These respondents had no such legitimate expectation given the "purely commercial nature of the transaction engaged in here, the relatively short period of time on the premises, and the lack of any previous connection between respondents and the householder." Respondents were much closer in nature to one merely "legitimately on the premises" or "present with the consent of the householder" (and thus not clothed with the protection of the Fourth Amendment) than to the overnight guest of Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990), who had a legitimate expectation of privacy based upon long-standing social custom recognized by society as serving valuable functions and upon everyday expectations of privacy shared by all.

Other Opinions: Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the majority opinion because it "accurately applies our recent case law." He wrote separately to stress that proper textual and historical construction of the Fourth Amendment establishes a right to be free from unreasonable searches only in one's own house. Minnesota v. Olson stretched that principle to the limit, but was justifiable under a theory that an overnight guest was a temporary resident. The respondents in the instant case "were not searched in 'their...hous[e],'" according to Scalia, "under any interpretation of the phrase that bears the remotest relationship to the well understood meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Scalia criticized the "legitimate expectation of privacy" test, derived from Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), as a proper tool for deciding whether a Fourth Amendment search has occurred, calling the Katz test "fuzzy" and "unhelpful." Justice Kennedy concurred in the majority opinion because "its reasoning is consistent with my view that almost all social guests have a legitimate expectation of privacy, and hence protection against unreasonable searches, in their host's home." Kennedy noted that respondents had "established nothing more than a fleeting and insubstantial connection with [the lessee's] home," and that they were not her guests. Justice Breyer concurred only in the judgment. He agreed with the dissent that respondents could claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but argued that the officer had not conducted a search. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, dissented, maintaining that "when a homeowner or lessor personally invites a guest into her home to share in a common endeavor, whether it be for conversation, to engage in leisure activities, or for business purposes licit or illicit, that guest should share his host's shelter against unreasonable searches and seizures." According to Ginsburg, "[t]hrough the host's invitation, the guest gains a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home." It is clear that Ginsburg is primarily concerned with the effect the majority decision will have on the rights of homedwellers: "As I see it, people are not genuinely 'secure in their ... houses ... against unreasonable searches and seizures,' U.S. Const., Amdt. 4, if their invitations to others increase the risk of unwarranted governmental peering and prying into their dwelling places."

Comment: It is important to note that at least five members of the Court support Justice Kennedy's proposition that "almost all social guests have a legitimate expectation of privacy, and hence protection against unreasonable searches, in their host's home." (Four of those five would go even further.) This should provide some guidance to lower courts and practitioners. The majority noted the lack of any "previous connection" or "previous relationship" between respondents and the lessee, but at least as a technical matter this does not appear to have been true. There had to have been some kind of previous connection between respondents and the lessee, even if only fleeting, in order for the parties to have negotiated the terms of the bagging operation.